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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, : Case No. 20021038-SC 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted the state's petition to review the Court of Appeals' decision in 
State v. Samora. 2002 UT App 384, 59 P.3d 604 (Samora II). A copy of that decision is 
in Addendum A. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: The only issue on certiorari, as articulated by Petitioner, the State of Utah, is 
whether "a sentence [can] be illegal for purposes of [Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure] 
22(e), but nevertheless limit the range of resentencing on remand?" Petitioner's Brief 
("Pet. Brf.") at 2. 
Standard of review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of 
Appeals for correctness. See State v. Layman. 1999 UT 79, f3,985 P.2d 911 (citing 
Butterfieldv.Okubo. 831 P.2d 97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992)). In so doing, it applies the 
standard of review utilized by the Court of Appeals in analyzing the issue. Id. The Court 
of Appeals properly applied a correctness review in analyzing the sentencing error that 
occurred in this case. Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, [^7 (citing State v. Kenison, 2000 
UT App 322, f7, 14 P.3d 129). 
OPINION BELOW 
The Court of Appeals' opinion in Samora II, 2002 UT App 384 is in 
Addendum A. 
STATUTE. RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statute, rule and constitutional provisions are relevant to the issue 
raised on certiorari. The texts of the statute, rule and constitutional provisions are in 
Addendum B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); 
Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution; 
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 18, 2000, the state charged Respondent/Defendant Manuel Samora 
("Respondent" or "Mr. Samora") with unlawful control of a motor vehicle with the intent 
to temporarily deprive, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1 a-
1314 (1998). R. 07. On August 8, 2000, Mr. Samora pled guilty to attempted unlawful 
control of a motor vehicle with intent to temporarily deprive, a class A misdemeanor, 
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before Third District Court Judge Robin W. Reese. R. 63. Judge Reese scheduled 
sentencing for September 22, 2000 before Third District Court Judge J. Dennis 
Frederick. R. 63:80. 
When Mr. Samora did not appear at sentencing on September 22, 2000, Judge 
Frederick sentenced him in absentia to the maximum one year sentence, imposed a fine 
of $2500 with a surcharge of $2119.05, and imposed attorney fees of $250. R. 42-43; 
see original judgment in Addendum C. Judge Frederick did not impose restitution in the 
original judgment. R. 42-43. 
Mr. Samora appealed the original judgment, claiming that he was sentenced in 
violation of due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a). In an opinion 
issued September 7, 2001, the Court of Appeals agreed with Mr. Samora's claims, 
vacated the sentence, and remanded the case for resentencing. See. State v. Samora, 2001 
UT App 266 (unpublished) (Samora I), a copy of which is in Addendum D. 
At resentencing, Judge Frederick refused to give Mr. Samora credit for the 
approximately six months of jail time he served on the previous sentence that had been 
illegally imposed. See transcript of November 16, 2001 resentencing (R. 122); see also 
judgment (from which this appeal was taken) entered after resentencing, a copy of which 
is in Addendum E. Immediately after resentencing, Mr. Samora filed a motion asking 
Judge Frederick to reconsider the denial of credit for time he had served on this case. 
On December 3, 2001, while that motion was still pending, Mr. Samora filed a notice of 
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appeal from the second judgment. Judge Frederick thereafter granted the motion to 
reconsider and gave Mr. Samora credit for the jail time he had already served on this 
case. SeeR. 118. 
On November 15, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Samora II , 
holding that the sentencing judge violated due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 
(1999) when he imposed a harsher sentence after the original sentence was vacated on 
appeal. Samora II. 2002 UT App 384, ^[23; see. Addendum A. The state filed a timely 
petition for writ of certiorari and this Court agreed to review the sole issue of whether a 
sentence can "be illegal for purposes of [Rule] 22(e), but nevertheless limit the range of 
resentencing on remand?1' State's petition for writ of certiorari at 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mr. Samora was charged with taking his girlfriend's car on March 31, 2000. 
R. 07, 21. According to the plea affidavit, he had been living with his girlfriend for over 
three years at the time, and he did not intend to permanently deprive her of the vehicle. 
R.21. 
When Mr. Samora did not appear at the original sentencing, the sentencing judge 
sentenced him in absentia to the statutory maximum jail term but did not impose 
restitution. R. 42-43. The Court of Appeals vacated that sentence because it was 
imposed in violation of due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a). 
Samora L 2001 UT App 266. 
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While the initial appeal was pending, Mr. Samora was arrested and began serving 
the one year sentence that was originally imposed. R. 122:3. He served several months 
of that sentence prior to being resentenced following his successful appeal. R. 122:3. 
Having already served a significant portion of the jail sentence at the time he was 
resentenced, Mr. Samora asked the judge at resentencing to reimpose the one year 
sentence but give him credit for the several months he had already served, so that he 
would have f!a clean break, get this done, start a new life." R. 122:3. Mr. Samora also 
asked nthe trial court to waive or substantially reduce his fine so that [he] could instead 
pay restitution.11 SamoraJI, 2002 UT App 384, TJ19. Defense counsel stated: 
[i]t would be my request on behalf of Mr. Samora that the Court do a 
couple of things. One, that the Court would waive the fine. There is some 
restitution owing that was part of the negotiation in this case to the victim. 
They've - - Mr. Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly long-term 
relationship before this all happened and there was, as a part of the 
negotiation, he's to pay some restitution with respect to that. 
We'd ask the Court to - - to waive or at least to reduce the fine substantially 
and - - and ask that the Court give him credit for time served on this case. 
R. 122:3-4. Although the state claimed below that Mr. Samora invited the error in 
imposing a harsher sentence on remand, the Court of Appeals rejected that argument and 
concluded that" after reading the sentencing proceeding transcript in context, it is 
apparent that Defendant was asking the trial court to waive or substantially reduce his 
fine so that Defendant could instead pay restitution," and that Mr. Samora did not agree 
to the increased sentence. SamoralL 2002 UT App 384, ^ [19. The state has accepted the 
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conclusion that Mr. Samora did not invite this error and has not challenged that 
determination on certiorari. 
The trial court imposed a one year jail sentence but refused to give Mr. Samora 
credit for the six months he had served since May 16, 2001. R. 122:9. The trial court 
later corrected this error after defense counsel filed a motion for reconsideration. R. 118-
19. The increased restitution remains in place. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 preclude the imposition of a harsher 
sentence after a defendant successfully appeals the initial sentence. The rationale behind 
the statutory and constitutional protections is to prevent vindictiveness in resentencing 
and to assure that there is no chilling effect on the exercise of the right to appeal. The 
United States Supreme Court has recognized that it would be extremely difficult to prove 
retaliatory motivation and therefore requires that "the constitutional legitimacy1' of any 
increased sentence following a successful appeal must be apparent from the face of the 
record. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). In this case where the trial 
court imposed a harsher sentence after Mr. Samora successfully appealed the illegal 
manner in which the first sentence was imposed, the Court of Appeals correctly 
concluded that the harsher sentence violated section 76-3-405 and due process. 
The state claims on certiorari that the constitutional and statutory limitations on 
imposing a harsher sentence after the defendant successfully appeals his initial sentence 
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do not apply when an appellate court utilizes Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) to 
reach a sentencing issue on appeal The state's claim fails for two reasons: (1) a review 
of the decision in Samora I fails to establish that the Court of Appeals utilized Rule 22(e) 
to reach the issue of whether the original sentence was illegally imposed; and (2) even if 
the Court of Appeals did reach the issue under Rule 22(e), nothing in the language of the 
rule or section 76-3-405 allows for harsher sentencing on remand, this Court's decision 
in State v.Babbell. 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991) ("Babbell II") does not allow for harsher 
sentencing in the context of this case, and the rationale for precluding harsher sentences 
following a successful appeal applies in these circumstances. 
First, a review of the decision in Samora I fails to establish that the Court of 
Appeals utilized Rule 22(e) to reach the issue of whether the original sentence was 
illegally imposed; the state's entire premise on certiorari - - that a sentence that is vacated 
under Rule 22(e) is not subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations on 
resentencing - - therefore does not apply in this case. Mr. Samora argued in the initial 
appeal that the claim that he was sentenced in an illegal manner was preserved and, 
alternatively, that the sentence could be reviewed either under the plain error doctrine or 
Rule 22(e). Since the Court of Appeals did not clarify how it reached the issue in 
Samora L the state cannot establish that the sentencing issue in the original appeal was 
reached under Rule 22(e). 
Second, even if the issue was reached under Rule 22(e), the constitutional and 
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statutory limitations on resentencing apply when a defendant successfully appeals the 
manner in which sentence was imposed. As the Court of Appeals recognized, Babbell II 
does not allow for imposition of a harsher sentence in this case because Babbell II did 
not involve a situation where a defendant successfully appealed the manner in which his 
sentence was imposed. SamoraJl, 2002 UT App 384, ^ [15. The rationale behind the 
statutory and constitutional protections applies with full force in this context where the 
presumption of vindictiveness raised by the harsher sentence was not rebutted; if the 
harsher sentence is allowed, a defendant such as Mr. Samora who is sentenced in an 
illegal manner may well forgo an appeal out of fear that even if he is successful, the 
sentencing court will impose a harsher sentence at resentencing. The important role of 
the right to appeal would be undermined by such an approach. Nothing in the rule, 
section 76-3-405 or cases outlining the due process limitation suggest that the due 
process and statutory limitations following a successful appeal do not apply when the 
illegality of the manner in which the sentence is imposed is reached on appeal under 
Rule 22(e). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals correctly applied those limitations and 
vacated the sentence in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY CONCLUDED 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND UTAH 
CODE ANN. $ 76-3-405 WHEN IT IMPOSED A HARSHER 
SENTENCE AFTER THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE WAS VACATED 
ON APPEAL. 
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In the original appeal, the Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Samora's sentence 
because it was imposed in violation of due process and Rule 22(a). Samora 1, 2001 UT 
App 266. On remand, the trial court imposed a harsher sentence. Samora II, 2002 UT 
App 384, 1^19. 
Mr. Samora again appealed, this time arguing that the increased sentence 
following his successful appeal violated due process and section 76-3-405. The Court of 
Appeals agreed with Mr. Samora that the trial court for a second time illegally imposed 
his sentence, this time in violation of due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405. 
Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, ^23. The Court of Appeals' decision was correct and 
should be upheld by this Court. 
A. Due Process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 Prohibit the Imposition of 
a Harsher Sentence After a Defendant Successfully Appeals the Initial 
Sentence. 
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, "mandates that a sentence after reversal of a criminal conviction cannot be 
more severe than the original sentence, 'unless the reason for the increased sentence, 
based on identifiable conduct by the defendant following the original trial, appears in the 
record."1 State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, f73, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting State v. Sorenson . 
639 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1981)). The purpose of the rule prohibiting a harsher sentence 
after a defendant successfully appeals is that the rule "works to 'assure that there is no 
chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant's exercise of his basic constitutional right 
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appeal.'" Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, f73 (quoting Sorenson. 639 P.2d at 181). 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, "due process prevents the sentencing judge 
from increasing the sentence when that increase is motivated by vindictiveness." 
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, }^9. Due process also protects defendants from a concern 
that judges may impose a harsher sentence if they successfully appeal a judicial error, 
thereby ensuring that there is not a chilling effect on the right to appeal. IcL. The Court 
of Appeals stated in Samora II: 
In North Carolina v.Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 
2080, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), the Supreme Court held that when 
resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the sentencing judge from 
increasing the sentence when that increase is motivated by vindictiveness. 
To free defendants from apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation, the 
Supreme Court held that "whenever a judge imposes a more severe 
sentence upon a defendant," the reasons must affirmatively appear on the 
record and "be based upon objective information concerning identifiable 
conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original 
sentencing proceeding." IdL at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 2081 (further citation and 
parenthetical omitted). 
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, %9. 
Protecting a defendant from a vindictive judge and ensuring that there is no 
chilling effect on the right to appeal are at the heart of the due process protection against 
imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals. See generally 
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. Recognizing that "[t]he existence of a retaliatory motivation 
would, of course, be extremely difficult to prove in any individual case," the United 
States Supreme Court required that "the constitutional legitimacy" of any increased 
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sentence be reviewable on appeal from the face of the record. IcL at 725 n.20, 726. 
In order to further the goals of preventing vindictiveness in resentencing or a 
chilling effect on the right to appeal, "the burden is on the State to establish that [a 
harsher sentence imposed following a successful appeal] did not violate the requirements 
of due process and section 76-3-405." Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, ^|8, n.2 (citing 
Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726). To sustain this burden, the state must point to facts that appear 
on the record which show "identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring 
after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.'" Samora II, 2002 UT App 384, [^9 
(quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 766); but see Texas v. McCullough. 475 U.S. 134, 140-42 
(1986) (suggesting that there might be bases other than conduct by defendant after 
imposition of the original sentence that would justify imposition of a harsher sentence 
following a successful appeal). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999) also precludes the imposition of a harsher 
sentence after a defendant successfully appeals, and is even "more stringent than the due 
process protection '" Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, Tf73 (quoting Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 
180). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 states: 
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prior sentence 
has been set aside. 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or 
on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same 
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more 
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence 
previously satisfied. 
l l 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to 
the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court 
affirmatively places on the record the facts which provide the basis 
for the increased sentence; or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution 
and later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which 
case the defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position as 
though the plea bargain, conviction, and sentence never occurred. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 (1999) (emphasis added). By its terms, the statutory 
limitation applies when a conviction or sentence is set aside on direct review. IdL Like 
the constitutional provision, the purpose of the statute "is to prevent the chilling effect on 
the constitutional right to appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have 
on a defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible error in his conviction." 
Babbell IL 813 P.2d at 88. As the Court of Appeals pointed out in Samora II, this Court 
held in Sorenson that the statute "prevents the Utah constitutional right to appeal 
(Article VIII, §9) from being impaired 'by imposing on a defendant who demonstrates 
the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence for 
having done so.5" SamoralL 2002 UT App 384, ^ [11 (quoting Sorenson. 639 P.2d at 180 
(quoting Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980))). 
The statute is "more stringent than the due process protection, [and] 'allows for no 
exceptions.5" Bakajov, 1999 UT 45, f73 (quoting Sorenson, 639 P.2d at 180). "The 
meaning of a 'more severe5 sentence is clear. 'The second sentence cannot exceed the 
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first in appearance or effect, in the number of its elements, or in their magnitude.'" 
Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, ^ |73 (quoting Sorenson. 639 P.2d at 181 (further citation 
omitted)). The statutory protection precludes the addition of anew element in the 
sentence, the augmentation of any element of the sentence, or "an increase in one element 
of [the] sentence by elimination of another." Wisden v. District Court« 694 P.2d 605, 
606 (Utah 1984). Despite the stringent protections offered by section 76-3-405, the state 
fails to analyze the language of the statute or explain why the sentence in this case, which 
was set aside on direct review, is not subject to the section 76-3-405 protections as 
outlined in the plain language of that statute. The state likewise all but ignores the due 
process limitation on resentencing following a successful appeal and the rationale for 
such limitation. 
This Court has consistently held that any increase in the severity of a sentence 
following a successful appeal violates the statutory and constitutional protections. For 
example, in Bakalov, the Court vacated a fine which was imposed after the defendant 
successfully appealed his conviction; because the original sentence did not include a fine, 
this Court held, "[t]he fine the trial court imposed after the second trial undisputably 
violates these [statutory and constitutional] provisions." Bakalov., 1999 UT 45, ^ [73. In 
Wisden, the Court held that increased jail time after the defendant appealed his justice 
court conviction violated double jeopardy and the statutory protection against harsher 
sentences even though the fine was reduced. Wisden, 694 P.2d at 606; see also Chess, 
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617 P.2d 343 (recognizing that section 76-3-405 and due process require that a 
defendant's decision as to whether to exercise his constitutional right to appeal "may not 
be impaired by making it conditional upon the threat of a harsher sentence [following a 
successful appeal]"). 
The Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy, Utah Code Ann. § 76-
3-405, and case law from Utah appellate courts and the United States Supreme Court 
require that the justification for an increased sentence following a successful appeal must 
affirmatively appear on the face of the record. See e ^ Pearce, 395 U.S. at 766. In 
Samora IL the Court of Appeals correctly recognized the importance of this requirement, 
pointing out that a fear of vindictiveness and a concomitant chilling effect on the exercise 
of the right to appeal would occur if a trial court were allowed to impose a harsher 
sentence following a successful appeal without justification appearing in the record. 
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, fflj9-13, 19. 
The Court of Appeals recognized the due process and statutory protections, the 
protection against vindictiveness and the goal of precluding a chilling effect on the 
exercise of the right to appeal, and held in this case that the presumption of 
vindictiveness raised by the imposition of a harsher sentence on remand following a 
successful appeal was not rebutted in the record. Samora II. 2002 UT App 384, ^ 19. In 
fact, the record suggests vindictiveness on the part of the trial court in that the trial judge 
increased not only the amount of money Mr. Samora was required to pay as the result of 
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the conviction, but also the amount of jail time he was required to serve by initially 
refusing to give him credit for the several months he had served while this case was 
originally on appeal. Id, Tfl[5-6. Although the trial court subsequently reconsidered the 
refusal to give credit for time served, the increased restitution nevertheless remained in 
place. In this case where the justification for the increased sentence did not appear in the 
record, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the presumption of vindictiveness 
raised by an increased sentence following a successful appeal was not rebutted, and that 
the harsher sentence violated due process and section 76-3-405.l Id, f 19. 
B. The State's Claim that this Sentence Was Vacated Under Rule 22(e) 
Does Not Change the Court of Appeals' Correct Conclusion that Due 
Process and Section 76-3-405 Required that this Sentence Be Vacated. 
1
 The State made an alternative argument in the Court of Appeals that the 
increased sentence was appropriate because the sentencing judge did not know that 
restitution was owing when he imposed sentence the first time. Samora II, 2002 UT App 
384, f20. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument because restitution was 
discussed at the plea hearing and outlined in the plea affidavit. Id_ The fact that the 
sentencing judge failed to familiarize himself with the record or case at the initial 
sentencing and instead rushed to impose a sentence in violation of due process and 
Rule 22(a) ffdoes not satisfy the lack of knowledge requirement found in section 76-3-
405 [and due process]." Id. at ^[21. Because the trial court "is charged with knowledge 
of what is in the record" in the case before it, the existence of restitution was not new 
information that justified an increased sentence. Id. 
Like its invited error argument, the state did not raise on certiorari its claim that 
the increased sentence was "based on facts which were not known to the court at the time 
of the original sentence." Id., ^|20. This claim is therefore not properly before this Court. 
Instead, the only claim before this Court of certiorari is the state's claim that the due 
process and section 76-3-405 protections do not apply when a defendant successfully 
appeals his sentence under Rule 22(e). 
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The rule prohibiting imposition of a harsher sentence following a defendant's 
successful appeal "is particularly compelling in this state because there are two explicit 
state constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to appeal, Article I, section 12 of the 
Declaration of Rights in the Utah Constitution and Article VIII, section 5." Babbell I I . 
813 P.2d at 87. Despite the importance of this rule in protecting the right to appeal, 
Petitioner barely acknowledges the existence of the due process and statutory limitations 
or the rationale for such limitations, in making the state's argument before this Court. 
See Pet. Brf. at 8. In fact, while the Court of Appeals based its decision on the fact that 
this record failed to show that the trial court was not acting vindictively in imposing a 
harsher sentence as well as the idea that to allow imposition of a harsher sentence under 
these circumstances would have a chilling effect on the right to appeal, the state 
disregards these concerns when it argues that imposition of a harsher sentence is always 
allowed if a court utilizes Rule 22(e) as a procedural tool for reaching the merits of 
whether the sentence was illegally imposed. See Pet. Brf. at 6-20. 
The State's claim that the due process and section 76-3-405 protections do not 
apply in this case because the Court of Appeals initially vacated the sentence under 
Rule 22(e) fails for two reasons. First, a review of Samora I and the briefs filed in that 
case fails to establish that the original sentence was vacated under Rule 22(e). The state 
therefore cannot establish that its entire premise on certiorari - - that due process and 
section 76-3-405 do not apply when a sentence is vacated on appeal under Rule 22(e) - -
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applies to this case. Second, even if the original sentence were vacated under Rule 22(e), 
the state is incorrect that the due process and section 76-3-405 protections are not 
implicated when a defendant successfully appeals a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner and utilizes Rule 22(e) to reach the issue because the claim was not raised below. 
1. The Court of Appeals Did Not Rely on Rule 22(e) When It Vacated the 
Sentence in the Initial Appeal 
Petitioner's sole claim on certiorari is that an increased sentence is permissible at 
resentencing when the illegality of the manner in which the initial sentence was imposed 
was reached on appeal under Rule 22(e). See Pet. Brf. at 2, 6-19. As a threshold matter, 
this argument fails in this case because the state cannot establish that Mr. Samora's initial 
sentence was vacated under Rule 22(e) in Samora I. 
Mr. Samora argued in his initial appeal that he was sentenced in violation of due 
process and Rule 22(a). Samora L 2001 UT App 384, ^ [2. He claimed that the issue was 
preserved; in the alternative, he claimed that the judge committed plain error in 
sentencing him in violation of due process and Rule 22(a) by not relying on relevant and 
reliable information and by not affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak at 
sentencing. See Appellant's opening brief in Samora I at 2-4, 13; see Addendum F. 
The Court of Appeals agreed in Samora I that the trial court violated due process 
and Rule 22(a) when it initially sentenced Mr. Samora, and vacated that sentence. 
Samora L 2001 UT App 266. In so doing, the Court of Appeals did not articulate 
whether it reached the issue because it was preserved, or under Rule 22(e), or pursuant to 
1 7 
the plain error doctrine. Id, Instead, the Court simply recognized that Mr. Samora raised 
the same issues regarding sentencing in absentia, due process and Rule 22(a) that were 
raised in Wanosik and stated that the decision in State v. Wanosik. 2001 UT App 241, 31 
P.3d 615, was therefore dispositive and required remand for resentencing. Samora I . 
2001 UT App 266. 
The remainder of the decision in Samora I likewise does not demonstrate that the 
illegality of the manner in which Mr. Samora was sentenced was reached under 
Rule 22(e). In fact, footnote 1 suggests that the case was not decided under Rule 22(e) 
since the Court of Appeals noted the existence of Rule 22(e) and pointed out that if it 
were to dismiss the appeal in Samora I, as requested by the state, Mr. Samora could 
nevertheless have the issue reviewed in the trial court pursuant to Rule 22(e). Samora I , 
2001 UT App 384, f3n. 1. In an aside, citing Wanosik, the Court also recognized that a 
defendant can challenge the legality of a sentence under Rule 22(e) even though the issue 
is raised for the first time on appeal. IcL The Court of Appeals stated in footnote 1: 
FN1. Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Samora could challenge the 
sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) ("The court may correct... a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time."); see also Wanosik, 
2001 UT App 241 at n. 11 (stating issues regarding illegality of the 
sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal 
under Rule 22(e)). Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal 
from the sentence and preserve the State's ability to seek dismissal in any 
appeal taken after resentencing. 
Samora L 2001 UT App 266, n. 1. If the Court were already reviewing the illegally 
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imposed sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), footnote 1 would have been unnecessary and 
inconsistent. 
Nothing in the Court of Appeals' resolution of SamoraX establishes that the issue 
was reached under Rule 22(e). The state's claim on certiorari that at resentencing, the 
trial court could impose a harsher sentence because the initial sentence was vacated 
under Rule 22(e) is not well taken since a fair reading of Samora I fails to demonstrate 
that the Court of Appeals reviewed the illegally imposed sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e) 
in Samora I. 
2. Even if the Issue in Samora I Was Reached Under Rule 22(e), the Due 
Process and Statutory Limitations on Resentencing Nevertheless Apply in 
this Case Where Mr, Samora Successfully Appealed His Illegally Imposed 
Sentence; to Allow Imposition of a Harsher Sentence in this Case Would 
Have a Chilling Effect on the Right to Appeal and Would Allow 
Vindictiveness in Resentencing. 
The meat of the state's argument on certiorari is that any time a sentence is 
vacated under Rule 22(e), the sentencing court is free to impose a harsher sentence. See 
Pet. Brf. at 6-20. The state apparently wants this to be the case regardless of whether the 
sentence is vacated after a successful appeal by the defendant and regardless of whether 
allowing the imposition of a harsher sentence would have a chilling effect on the right to 
appeal or allow vindictiveness in resentencing. 
According to the state, cases decided under Rule 22(e) are free from the due 
process and statutory limitations at resentencing. Pet. Brf. at 6-20. The state says that 
since Babbell II tells us that the illegal sentence in that case was void and not subject to 
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the statutory and constitutional limitations, sentences imposed in an illegal manner are 
likewise void and not subject to the statutory and due process protections. The state 
claims that the Court of Appeals improperly created two types of sentencing error under 
Rule 22(e) and a correct interpretation of the rule and Babbell II requires that the due 
process and statutory limitations do not apply when any sentencing error is reached on 
appeal under Rule 22(e). Pet. Brf. at 6-20. 
A review of Rule 22(e) and case law demonstrates, however, that the state is 
incorrect since (1) the rule itself recognizes two types of sentencing error, (2) Babbell II 
does not allow for harsher sentencing after a defendant successfully appeals a sentence 
that was imposed in an illegal manner, and (3) the due process and section 76-3-405 
rationale for precluding a harsher sentence following a successful appeal applies with full 
force in the circumstances of this case. 
(a) The Plain Language of Rule 22(e) Recognizes Two Types of Sentences 
that Can Be Corrected at Any Time. 
As a preliminary matter, the state incorrectly argues that the Court of Appeals 
improperly created two types of Rule 22(e) sentencing error in this case. A review of the 
language of Rule 22(e) establishes that the plain language of the rule, not the decision of 
the Court of Appeals, recognizes two types of sentencing error, both of which are 
egregious enough to warrant correction at any time. Because the plain language of the 
rule acknowledges two types of sentencing error that can be reached at any time, treating 
illegal sentences distinctly from sentences imposed in an illegal manner is consistent with 
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the rule. 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, "[t]he court may correct 
an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(e). This rule allows the trial court to reassume jurisdiction to correct an 
illegal sentence, or a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner, regardless of the 
passage of time. Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e); State v. Lee Lim, 79 Utah 68, 7 P.2d 825 (Utah 
1932). The rule also allows a criminal defendant to challenge the legality of his sentence 
on appeal even if the issue was not raised below. State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856 (Utah 
1995). To challenge a sentence under Rule 22(e) on appeal, however, a timely filed 
appeal must be in place. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a); Glezos v. Frontier Inv.. 896 P.2d 
1230, 1233 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (a timely notice of appeal must be filed for an appellate 
court to have jurisdiction to review a case); Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434, 436 
(Utah 1982) (appellate court "lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal if a notice of appeal 
was not timely filed").2 
2
 The state contends, without support, that the decision in Samora II "likely 
abrogates the ordinary requirements for filing a timely notice of appeal" (Pet. Brf. at 5, 
14) and suggests that a defendant can challenge sentencing error in an appellate court 
under Rule 22(e) "even though he does not file a notice of appeal." Pet. Brf. at 13. This 
is incorrect. A timely notice of appeal is required for an appellate court to have 
jurisdiction to review a judgment in a criminal case. See Bowen. 656 P.2d at 436. While 
Rule 22(e) does allow a trial court to reassume jurisdiction in a case in which it imposed 
sentence, nothing in the rule or Utah decisions suggests that Rule 22(e) creates 
jurisdiction in an appellate court that never had jurisdiction over a case simply because a 
defendant filed a Rule 22(e) motion in the appellate court. 
Additionally, even if this were the case, there is nothing in Samora II or the issue 
before this Court on certiorari in this case that creates such jurisdiction. The Court of 
2 1 
By its plain language, Rule 22(e) allows a challenge not only to an illegal 
sentence, but also to a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner. Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(e)(emphasis added). An illegal sentence is a sentence that does not conform to the 
sentence that is authorized by statute. See e,g. State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 
1989) ("Babbelll") (sentence was illegal where court did not impose statutorily 
mandated minimum mandatory prison sentence). A sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, on the other hand, is a sentence that is within statutory limits, but which is 
imposed in a manner that violates a defendant's rights or which is based on erroneous 
information. See State v. Headlev, 2002 UT App 58 n.2 (unpublished) (citing inter alia 
Appeals had jurisdiction in Samora I and Samora II because Mr. Samora filed timely 
notices of appeal from the first and second judgments; according to the state, the Court of 
Appeals then used Rule 22(e) as the procedure that made review appropriate in the 
absence of preservation below. Since Samora II does not indicate that Rule 22(e) creates 
appellate jurisdiction, the state's discussion of that claim is not pertinent. Nor is the 
state's claim that using Rule 22(e) in an appellate court to review sentencing error 
necessarily included in the issue raised by the state in its petition for certiorari. 
Moreover, assuming for the purposes of argument that the state is correct that 
appellate review under Rule 22(e) creates appellate jurisdiction and "likely abrogates the 
ordinary requirements for filing a timely notice of appeal" (Pet. Brf. at 5, 13), that 
concern should have been addressed in Brooks, 908 P.2d 856. In Brooks., this Court held 
that an appellate court has "the authority under rule 22(e) to address a claim of an illegal 
sentence for the first time on appeal." Id. Nothing in Samora II expands on Brooks to 
allow an appellate court to assume jurisdiction based solely on Rule 22(e). To the extent 
the state is correct that allowing an appellate court to address a sentencing claim raised 
for the first time on appeal under Rule 22(e) also creates appellate jurisdiction without 
requiring a timely notice of appeal, that determination was already made in Brooks and is 
not properly before the Court on certiorari in this case. 
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Government of the V.I, v. Martinez, 239 F.3d 293, 299 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001); State v. 
McNellis, 546 A.2d 292, 305-06 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988); State v. Sieler . 554 N.W.2d 
477, 479 (S.D. 1996)). A copy ofHeadlev is in Addendum G. 
As the Court of Appeals noted in Headley, many jurisdictions have recognized 
this distinction between an illegal sentence and a sentence that was imposed in an illegal 
manner. Headlev, 2002 UT App 58 n. 2, citing inter alia Martinez. 239 F.3d at 299 n. 3; 
McNellis, 546 A.2d at 305-06. In Martinez, the Court articulated the distinction between 
an illegal sentence and a sentence imposed in an illegal manner as follows: 
"'Illegal sentences are essentially only those which exceed the 
relevant statutory maximum limits or violate double jeopardy or are 
ambiguous or internally contradictory. Sentences imposed in an illegal 
manner are within the relevant statutory limits but are imposed in a way 
which violates defendant's right, under Rule 32, to be addressed personally 
at sentencing or to speak in mitigation of punishment, or his statutory right 
to be asked about his prior convictions ,in a proceeding to impose an 
enhanced sentence in a narcotics convictions or his right to be sentenced by 
a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the 
record . . . . " 
Martinez, 239 F.3d at 299 n.3 (quoting inter alia 8A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
P35.03[2](2ded. 1987)). 
The Court made a similar distinction between "illegal sentences" and sentences 
that are imposed in an illegal manner11 in McNellis, 546 A.2d at 305-06. 
An "illegal sentence" is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant 
statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double 
jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory. 
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. . . Sentences imposed in an illegal manner have been defined as being 
"within the relevant statutory limits bu t . . . imposed in a way which 
violates defendant's r ight. . . to be addressed personally at sentencing and 
to speak in mitigation of punishment... or his right to be sentenced by a 
judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the 
record, or his right that the government keep its plea agreement 
promises . . . . " 
Id. (further citation omitted).3 
3
 Petitioner claims that the interpretation of the phrase sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner by other jurisdictions should be viewed with caution because many other 
rules containing that language have a time limit on the ability to review a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner whereas Utah does not. Pet. Brf. at 12 n. 7. While the state 
is correct that many other jurisdictions limit the period of time in which a defendant can 
challenge a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, such limitation does not impact on the 
meaning of the phrase. 
Additionally, in most states, the time period for attacking a sentence that was 
imposed in an illegal manner extends beyond the first right of appeal. See e.g. Ark. Code 
Ann. § 6-90-111 (West 2001) (sentence imposed in an illegal manner can be corrected 
withint sixty days after receipt of mandate following appeal); S.D. Codified Laws § 23 A-
31-1 (West 2002)(court may correct sentence imposed in an illegal manner within 120 
days after receipt of remittitur following appeal). Indeed, the Arkansas and South 
Dakota statutes relied on by the state allow a defendant to challenge a sentence imposed 
in an illegal manner until a period of time after the case has been remitted from appeal. 
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This means that in both those states and many others, a defendant can challenge a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner while the case is on appeal even if the issue was 
not raised below. In other words, review of the illegally imposed sentence would be 
available in the procedural context of this case. Because statutes in other states also 
allow for a lengthy period of time in which to challenge a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner, the state's claim that the more limited time frame for challenging an illegally 
imposed sentence in those states somehow changes the meaning of the term is not 
persuasive. 
The definition of sentence imposed in an illegal manner used by other 
jurisdictions is the only logical meaning for that phrase; by its plain language, this phrase 
refers to the method by which the sentence is imposed. The state has not offered a 
plausible definition other than the one embraced by other jurisdictions which is apparent 
from the plain language of the rule. 
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The definition for sentences imposed in an illegal manner employed by other 
courts and Moore's Federal Practice is consistent with the plain language of Rule 22(e). 
Utah's rule, by its very language, allows a challenge not only to "illegal sentences," but 
also to "sentence[s] imposed in an illegal manner." The use of this distinct terminology, 
"sentence imposed in an illegal manner," necessarily indicates that defendants can use 
Rule 22(e) to challenge more than just sentences that do not comply with the statutory 
authorization. In fact, the word "manner" refers to "a way or method in which something 
is done or happens; mode or fashion of procedure." Webster's New World College 
Dictionary 875 (4th ed. 1999). The plain language of Rule 22(e) tells us then that a court 
can correct a sentence which is imposed by an illegal method or procedure at any time. 
A sentence which is imposed in violation of Rule 22(a) because the defendant or 
defense counsel is not afforded the opportunity to address information relevant to 
sentencing is a sentence imposed using an illegal method, i.e. in an illegal manner. See 
generally Headley, 2002 UT App 58 n. 2 (recognizing that "[o]ther jurisdictions have 
defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and 
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights"), A sentence imposed in violation 
of due process because the court improperly sentenced the defendant in absentia or 
because the sentencing court did not rely on relevant and reliable information is likewise 
a sentence imposed in an illegal manner. See generally id. Such an approach is 
consistent with the plain language of the rule as well as the definition employed by other 
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jurisdictions.4 
Because the plain language of Rule 22(e) makes a distinction between illegal 
sentences and sentences imposed in an illegal manner, the state's claim that the Court of 
Appeals created a new class of sentences is incorrect. The rule itself acknowledges two 
types of unlawful sentences - - those that are illegal because they are not statutorily 
authorized and those that are imposed in an illegal manner. Moreover, the rule allows 
4
 The state devotes much of its brief to a discussion of what it calls "ordinary 
sentencing error" as opposed to "Rule 22(e) sentencing error," and suggests that the 
Court of Appeals has improperly expanded the scope of "Rule 22(e) sentencing error" in 
a variety of cases . Pet. Brf. at 6-20. The issue on certiorari in this case is not whether 
the Court of Appeals misinterpreted the reach of Rule 22(e) in other cases, but whether 
the Court correctly concluded that if Rule 22(e) is used on appeal to reach a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, the limitations of due process and section 76-3-405 
preclude imposition of a harsher sentence on remand. 
Rule 22(e) is a means by which the court is allowed to proceed in a case. It allows 
an appellate court to vacate an illegal sentence or a sentence that was imposed in an 
illegal manner when the case is before it on appeal. In either case, the rule allows a court 
to correct an error in sentencing that is of sufficient magnitude that the interests of 
society as well as the interests of the defendant are served by vacating the sentence. 
The state also suggests, without any support, that the only sentences that should be 
reviewed under Rule 22(e) are those which are apparent without a review of the record. 
Pet. Brf. at 11-12 and n. 6 & 7. While this Court recognized in State v. Telford . 2002 
UT 51,1J5, 48 P.3d 228 that n[t]he purpose of rule 22(e) is to allow the correction of 
manifestly illegal sentences," it did not define manifestly illegal sentences as those that 
are apparent without reviewing the record. A manifestly illegal sentence is simply a 
sentence that is plainly, clearly, or evidently illegal. See Webster's New College 
Dictionary 875. Nothing in the rule or this Court's opinions suggest that the reach of 
Rule 22(e) is limited to sentences whose illegality is apparent without reviewing the 
record. Indeed, a review of the record is necessary to determine whether an illegal 
sentence that is not statutorily authorized was imposed, as was the case in Babbell II. 
Moreover, a review of the record would be necessary in almost any case where there is a 
claim that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Because the plain language of 
the rule applies to sentences imposed in an illegal manner, the state's claim that review of 
the record is not allowed under the rule is not persuasive. 
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either type of unlawful sentence to be vacated at any time. While sentences that are not 
authorized by statute are void because the court did not have the authority to enter them, 
sentences imposed in an illegal manner are, on their face lawful, but can be vacated if a 
court determines that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. 
(b) Babbell //Does Not Resolve the Issue of Whether a Trial Judge Can 
Impose a Harsher Sentence After a Defendant Successfully Appeals a 
Sentence that Was Imposed in an Illegal Manner. 
Although the state engages in a lengthy discussion of sentencing error as well the 
state's perceived concern that the Court of Appeals has extended the reach of Rule 22(e), 
its argument on certiorari is based primarily on BabbelllL 813 P.2d 86. As the Court of 
Appeals pointed out, however, the state's reliance on Babbell II "is misplaced." 
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, ^ [15. Babbell II does not resolve the issue in this case 
because it did not involve circumstances where a defendant successfully appealed a 
sentence that the trial court had imposed in an illegal manner. 
Babbell originally appealed his conviction on grounds unrelated to his sentence. 
See Babbell L 770 P.2d 987. During oral argument in the original appeal, the state 
brought up the fact that Babbell had not been sentenced as prescribed by statute. Id . at 
993-94. The state pointed out and this Court agreed that the statute required the 
imposition of a minimum mandatory prison sentence. Id. Because the sentences that had 
been imposed were not authorized by statute, this Court vacated the sentences. ML. at 
994. On remand, the trial court imposed the statutorily authorized, and harsher, 
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minimum mandatory sentences. Babbell II. 813 P.2d at 86. 
After the harsher sentences were imposed on remand, Babbell again appealed, 
arguing that due process and Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 prohibited the imposition of a 
harsher sentence. Babbell II, 813 P.2d at 87. This Court disagreed, pointing out in part 
that the initial sentences were illegal sentences because they were not authorized by 
statute and that the illegal sentences were therefore void. IdL at 87-88. The 
characterization of illegal sentences as void and therefore not subject to due process and 
section 76-3-504 limitations apparently planted the seed for the state's current argument 
that a sentence imposed in an illegal manner is also void and not subject to statutory and 
due process limitations. A complete reading of Babbell II, section 76-3-405, case law 
outlining the due process limitation on increased resentencing following a successful 
appeal, and common sense demonstrate that the state is incorrect, and that when a 
defendant successfully appeals a sentence imposed in an illegal manner and relies on 
Rule 22(e) to reach the issue, the trial court is precluded by constitutional and statutory 
protections from imposing a harsher sentence at resentencing. 
In Babbell IL this Court recognized the due process and section 76-3-405 
limitations on imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals a 
conviction or sentence. This Court stated that "[w]hen a criminal defendant successfully 
appeals a conviction or sentence, § 76-3-405 prohibits imposition of a new and harsher 
sentence based on the same conduct." Babbell II. 813 P.2d at 87 (emphasis added). This 
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Court also indicated that prohibiting the imposition of a harsher sentence after a 
defendant successfully appeals "is appropriate because federal 'due process of law . . . 
requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first 
conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new [sentencing].'" Id. 
(quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725). This Court further explained that federal due process 
and the importance of the state constitutional right of criminal defendants to appeal 
require that a harsher sentence not be imposed following a reversal on appeal. 
In State v. Sorenson, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981), this Court held 
that federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from being imposed in 
a second trial for the same offense after a reversal of the first conviction. 
That constitutional policy is particularly compelling in this state because 
there are two explicit state constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to 
appeal, Article I, section 12 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah 
Constitution and Article VIII, section 5. A defendant's constitutional right 
to appeal is further protected by § 76-3-405. The purpose behind these 
provisions is to prevent the chilling effect on the constitutional right to 
appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a 
defendant who might be able to demonstrate reversible error in his 
conviction. This Court has stated: 
The purpose of an appeal is to promote justice by ferreting 
out erroneous judgments. The purpose is not promoted by imposing 
on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk 
that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence for having done so. 
An erroneous judgment of convictions is as much an affront to 
society's interest in the fair administration of justice as it is an 
individual's rights. 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P. 2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980). 
BabbellIL813P.2dat88. 
Although imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals 
his sentence violates due process and section 76-3-405, it did not violate due process or 
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the statute in Babbell II because the defendant did not successfully appeal his sentence. 
Instead, this Court recognized while the case was on appeal that an illegal sentence 
which was more lenient than that which was mandated by statute had been imposed, and 
vacated that illegal sentence. This Court reasoned in Babbell II that section 76-3-405 
and due process were not violated by the imposition of a harsher sentence because there 
was no chilling effect on the right to appeal and the illegal sentence was not authorized 
by statute and was therefore void. Babbell II, 813 P.2d at 88. 
Nevertheless, the principles underlying Sorenson, Chess, Pearce, 
and § 76-3-405 have no application in this case. The correction of an 
illegal sentence stands on a different footing from the correction of an error 
of conviction. First, a defendant is not likely to appeal a sentence that is 
unlawfully lenient, and there is, therefore, minimal chilling effect on the 
right to appeal. 
Second, § 77-35-22(e) specifically provides that because an illegal 
sentence is void, a trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
Id 
The facts in Samora II are substantially different from those in Babbell II. First, 
Babbell did not successfully appeal in the original appeal; instead, this Court discovered 
while the case was on appeal that the sentence which had been imposed had no legal 
effect because it was not authorized by statute. By contrast, Mr. Samora successfully 
appealed the manner in which his sentence was imposed and received a new sentencing 
hearing because his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Second, the sentence in 
Babbell II was illegal and void because it was not a sentence that the trial court was 
authorized by statute to impose. The sentence had no legal effect and this Court 
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therefore correctly concluded that it was a void sentence because the trial judge did not 
have the authority to impose it. By contrast, the sentence imposed in this case was 
authorized by statute and the sentencing court had the power to impose it; the problem 
with the original sentence in this case was that the judge used an unlawful manner or 
method in imposing sentence. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, allowing a harsher sentence in this case 
would create a chilling effect on the right to appeal and allow vindictiveness in 
resentencing after a defendant prevails on appeal whereas none of the purposes served by 
the due process and section 76-3-405 limitations on resentencing would have been 
served by requiring the trial court to not impose the statutorily required, albeit harsher, 
sentence in Babbell II. See Babbell II, 813 P.2d at 88. If the trial court is permitted to 
impose a harsher sentence after a criminal defendant successfully appeals a sentence that 
was imposed in an unlawful manner, defendants like Mr. Samora who are sentenced in 
violation of due process and Rule 22(a) will not appeal for fear the trial judge will 
impose an even harsher sentence following a successful appeal. Sentencing courts could 
ignore the constitutional and statutory requirements for a full and fair sentencing hearing, 
but defendants would not appeal for fear the judge would act vindictively and impose a 
harsher sentence following a successful appeal. The appellate purpose of ferreting out 
erroneous judgments in which sentences were imposed in an illegal manner would be 
undermined if judges were given free rein to impose a harsher sentence after the 
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defendant successfully appeals the manner in which the sentence is imposed. Due 
process and section 76-3-405 therefore prohibit the imposition of a harsher sentence after 
a defendant successfully appeals the unlawful manner in which the sentence was 
imposed. 
In addition to disregarding the due process and statutory protections, the state also 
disregards this Court's recognition in Babbell II that resentencing more harshly might 
violate due process even in circumstances where the original sentence was void because 
it was not authorized by statute. Babbell IL 813 P.2d at 88. After holding in Babbell II 
that due process and section 76-3-405 did not preclude the imposition of a harsher 
sentence because the original illegal sentence was void, this Court stated, "[nevertheless, 
we acknowledge that 'there may be circumstances under which even a corrected illegal 
sentence may be fundamentally unfair, thus violative of Due Process."' IdL_ (quoting 
State v. Delmondo. 696 P.2d 344, 346 (Ha. 1985)). It would be fundamentally unfair to 
allow a harsher sentence in this case after Mr. Samora was forced to successfully appeal 
his original sentence in order to obtain a full and fair sentencing hearing. 
(c) The Court of Appeals Correctly Held that Due Process and Section 
76-3-405 Preclude the Imposition of a Harsher Sentence After a Defendant 
Successfully Appeals the Original Sentence that Was Imposed in an Illegal 
Manner. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeals recognized that Babbell II was not 
applicable and that due process and section 76-3-405 required that the trial court not 
impose a harsher sentence after Mr. Samora successfully appealed his original sentence. 
32 
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384,1J16. The Court of Appeals stated: 
In Babbell [II], the defendant was sentenced to a term less than the 
applicable statute's minimum mandatory requirements. 813 P.2d at 86. 
The supreme court concluded that the principles underlying Pearce, 
Sorenson, Chess, and section 76-3-405 did not apply because a defendant is 
unlikely to appeal a sentence that is unlawfully lenient, so there is a 
"minimal chilling effect on the right to appeal.ff 813 P.2d at 88. Unlike 
Babbell [II], Defendant's resentencing did not result from an original 
sentence contrary to statutory minimum mandatory requirements. Rather, 
Defendant's original sentence was vacated because he was sentenced in 
absentia. The sentence itself was not illegal, but the manner in which it 
was imposed was contrary to the law. Furthermore, allowing a harsher 
sentence when the original sentence was imposed in an illegal manner 
would have a "chilling effect on the right to appeal," id., and impair the 
Utah Constitution's guaranty of the right to appeal. See Sorenson, 639 
P.2d at 181. Therefore, because Babbell [II] is not applicable, we 
conclude that the due process discussion in Pearce, Sorenson, and Chess 
require us to apply the presumption of vindictiveness. 
Samora IL 2002 UT App 384, ^ [16. This decision is consistent with the language of 
Rule 22(e) and section 76-3-405 and furthers the policy behind the due process and 
statutory limitations on resentencing following a successful appeal. 
Nothing in the language of Rule 22(e) or section 76-3-405 suggests that when a 
defendant successfully appeals the manner in which his sentence is imposed utilizing 
Rule 22(e) to reach the issue, the trial court is free to impose a harsher sentence. In fact, 
the state fails to point to any language in either the rule or the statute that supports its 
claim that after a sentence that was imposed in an illegal manner is vacated on appeal 
under Rule 22(e), the sentencing court is free to impose an even harsher sentence. 
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Moreover, precluding imposition of harsher sentence after a defendant 
successfully appeals under Rule 22(e) the manner in which sentence was imposed, 
furthers the goal of preserving the right to appeal. It also ensures that defendants receive 
full and fair sentencing hearings where trial courts follow due process and statutory 
requirements. Because due process and section 76-3-405 preclude the imposition of a 
harsher sentence when a defendant is forced to appeal in order to receive a fair hearing, 
defendants who are sentenced in an illegal manner will not be afraid to appeal and ask 
for a full and fair sentencing hearing. 
The state complains that allowing a defendant to challenge, under Rule 22(e), a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, but imposing the section 76-3-405 and due 
process limitations at resentencing "is the best of all possible worlds for the defendant." 
Pet. Brf. at 13. Actually, it is the best approach for fairness and the integrity of the 
system. Not just the defendant, but the state as well, should be concerned that trial courts 
comply with due process and relevant statutes and rules when sentencing criminal 
defendants. When a trial court imposes a sentence in an illegal manner, justice and 
fairness require that the defendant be able to challenge the sentence and ask for a fair 
hearing without fear of reprisal. Rule 22(e) recognizes the importance of ensuring that 
sentences are imposed in a lawful manner by allowing the correction of a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner at any time. The policy behind the due process and section 
76-3-405 limitations on resentencing after a defendant successfully appeals is well served 
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issue. 
In this ease, where Mr. Samora successfully appealed his initial sentence claiming 
and fear of retaliation which is the root of the statutory and due process concern, it 
w ould discourage defendants from appealing sentences which are imposed in an illegal 
manner unow-i., i .-. . « •
 ; •. •; : , - ^ :;<il 
i . '">,!v:h . and serve as* ""an affront to society s interest 
in the Mr administration of justice5" as well as Mr. Samora's rights. .Sue. Babbell II, 813 
P.2d at 88 (quoting Chess, 617 P.2d at 343). Babbell II does not allc >w for the imposition 
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i -loosed, and du^ process and section 76-3-4U5 mandate that a 
harsher sentence ; .*•;*< p<.; be imposed. 
Moreover, R uk 22(e) recognizes the importance of correcting sentences imposed 
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to impose a harsher sentence after a defendant utilizes Rule 22(e) to correct a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner would undercut the efficacy of Rule 22(e). 
The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the trial court violated due process 
and section 76-3-405 in imposing a harsher sentence after Mr. Samora successfully 
appealed the manner in which the original sentence was imposed. Mr. Samora 
respectfully requests that this Court uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Manuel Samora respectfully requests that this Court uphold the 
decision of the Court of Appeals and vacate his sentence. 
SUBMITTED this J/"* day of July, 2003. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
JOHN K. WEST 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
1J1 Manuel Ernesto Samora (Defendant) appeals from a sentence for attempted joyriding with intent to temporarily 
deprive owner, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1a-1314 (1998) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-4-10 1 (1999), Defendant argues that the trial judge erred in imposing a harsher sentence following reversal 
of his original sentence on appeal. We vacate Defendant's sentence and remand. 
BACKGROt INC) 
f[2 On August 8, 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful control of a motor vehicle with intent to 
temporarily deprive owner. As part of his plea agreement with the State, Defendant agreed to pay restitution to 
the victim The trial court accepted Defendant's guilty plea and agreed to release him on his own recognizance 
pending sentencing. The trial court set sentencing for September 22, 2000, in front of a different trial judge. Wheii 
Defendant failed to appear for his September 22 sentencing, the trial court sentenced him in absentia to the 
statutory maximum one-year sentence, imposed a fine of $2500, a surcharge, and attorney fees The trial couit 
did not impose restitution. 
P Defendant appealed his sentence in absentia, claiming it violated due process and Rule 22(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure On September 7, 2001, this court in a per curiam opinion vacated Defendant's 
sentence and remanded his case for resentencing in accordance with State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 
P 3d 615, cert granted, 42 P 3d 951 (Utah 2002) W 
1J4 On November 16, 2001, Defendant appeared for resentencing before the judge who previously sentenced him 
During resentencing, defense counsel requested that the trial court waive or substantially reduce Defendant's fine 
so Defendant could pay the restitution that he originally agreed to as part of the plea negotiation Defense counsel 
also requested that Defendant be granted credit for the six months he had served on his sentence awaiting the 
original appellate disposition 
fl5 After taking testimony regarding the restitution amount owing, the trial court resentenced Defendant to the 
maximum one-year jail term, denying Defendant good-time credit for the six months he had served The court 
again imposed the maximum $2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees In addition, the court ordered that 
Defendant pay $744 80 in restitution 
1J6 Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence asking the trial court to reconsider its denial of credit for time 
served The trial court granted Defendant's Motion to Reconsider and gave him credit for the time he had served 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
fl7 Defendant claims the trial court erred by imposing restitution at resentencing when restitution was not imposed 
as part of Defendant's original sentence Because sentencing errors involve questions of law, we review for 
correctness See State v Kenison, 2000 UT App 322,^7, 14 P 3d 129 
ANALYSIS 
1J8 Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it imposed restitution at resentencing without waiving or 
substantially reducing the fine Defendant owed He contends that due process and Utah Code Ann § 76-3-405 
(1999), preclude the imposition of a harsher sentence after a case is reversed on appeal The State argues that 
Defendant invited any sentencing error when he declared his obligation to pay restitution Alternatively, the State 
asserts that the trial court may increase the penalties upon resentencing when the original sentence was illegal or 
is based on facts not known to the court at the time of the original sentencing ® 
U9 In North Carolina v Pearce, 395 U S 711, 725, 89 S Ct 2072, 2080 (1969), the Supreme Court held that 
when resentencing a defendant, due process prevents the sentencing judge from increasing the sentence when 
that increase is motivated by vindictiveness To free defendants from the apprehension of such a retaliatory 
motivation, the Supreme Court held that "whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant," 
the reasons must affirmatively appear on the record and "be based upon objective information concerning 
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding " ld_ 
at 766, 89 S Ct at 2081 ButseeTexasv McCullough, 475 U S 140, 142, 106 S Ct 976, 980-81 (1986) (stating 
that language "[Restricting justifications for a sentence increase to only 'events that occurred subsequent to the 
original proceeding'" was not "intended to describe exhaustively all of the possible circumstances in which a 
sentence increase could be justified") 
1J10 The Utah Code also addresses limitations on resentencing, as follows 
(1) Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on collateral attack, the 
court shall not impose a new sentence for the same offense or for a different offense based on the 
same conduct which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence 
previously satisfied 
(2) This section does not apply when 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to the court at the 
time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places on the record the facts 
which provide the basis for the increased sentence; 
I (tall i Code -Ar u i. § i: 6 3 105. 
f| I il In State v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 179, 130 (Utah 1981), the supreme court discussed the requirements of due 
process and section 78-3-405 in relation to resentencing., The supreme court held that section 76-3-405 
prevents the Utah constitutional i ight to appeal (Article VIII, § 9) from being impaired "by imposing 
on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his conviction the risk that he may be penalized with 
a harsher sentence for havinc A^nt=> ^o " 
Id (quoting Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2c - ' 4? (Utah 1980)), 
In the context of the due p* ,....^nent of hortn CaLPJinaj/^Pearce, [395 L. , " ; ,•-
2072], which seeks to assu - .. nere is no chilling or deterring of the criminal defendant '•: 
exercise of his basic constitutional right to appeal, and in light of the Utah constitutional constraint 
against impairing the right to appeal, as articulated in Chess v. Smith, [617 P.2d 341], we think the 
meaning of our statutory prohibition against a "more severe" second sentence is clear. The second 
sentence cannot exceed the first in appearance or effect in the number of its elements U.C A 
1953, § 76-3-201, or in their magnitude. 
Sorensen, 639 P.2d at 181 (alterations in original), 
H12 Our supreme court has also observed that section 76-3-405 is "more stringent than the due process 
protection [and] "allows for no exceptions."' State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45,^73, 979 P.2d 799 (quoting Sorensen, 
639 P.2d at 180). Although the State agrees that as a general rule a sentence imposed after a successful appeal 
cannot be more severe than the prior sentence, it argues that Defendant's case is different because he invited 
any erroi by volunteering that he owed restitution, 
TJ13 Defendant acknowledges he did i jot argue at resentencif ig tl iat the trial court was precluded from imposing a 
harsher sentence on resentencing. However, Defendant asserts plain error on appeal. The State counters, and 
our dissenting colleague agrees, that Defendant invited error by initiating the discussion of restitution and 
acknowledging that it was owed. Accordingly, the State asserts that a plain error analysis is not available. See 
State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Utah Ct App„ 1991) (stating invited error defeats claim of plain error). We 
have two initial responses. First, as noted in Wanosik, rule 22(e) permits this court to consider whether a 
defendant was illegally sentenced '"even if the issue is raised for the first time on appeal.'" State v. Wanosik, 2001 
UT App 241 ,U28 n.11, 31 P.3d 615, cert, granted, 42 P.3d 951 (Utah 2002) (quoting State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 
856, 860 (Utah 1995)). Second, the colloquy between the trial court and Defendant's counsel lacked si ifficient 
clarity to construe it as an invitation or stipulation for the trial court to violate section 76-3-405.® 
]^14 We acknowledge that Defendant did not provide a plain error analysis in his brief, alluding to it only in the 
standard of review section, perhaps relying on the proposition stated in Wanosik and Brooks, that the issue did 
not need to be preserved in the trial court. As noted in the dissenting opinion, plain error will be found only if the 
appellant establishes that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) The third factor is clearly established 
because Defendant received a more harsh sentence on resentencing. We next examine the first factor, whether 
error occurred, because that analysis is necessary to a plain error evaluation and also necessary if we have 
jurisdiction under Wanosik and Brooks. We note that this issue is addressed in Defendant's brief 
fl15 We begin our analysis by determining whether the presumptioi» u* vinuictiveiless as described in Pearce is 
applicable. See Pearce. 395 U.S. at 725, 89 S. Ct. at 2080; State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 1991). The 
State argues that the principles underlying Pearce are not applicable in this case because Defendant's original 
sentence was illegal, and under Babbel, id. at 88, an illegal sentence is void and not subject to the sentence 
protections articulated in Pearce, Sorensen, Chess, and section 76-3-405. However, we find the State's reliance 
on Babbel to be misplaced. 
1J16 In Babbel, the defendant was sentenced to a term less than the applicable statute's minimum mandatory 
requirements 819 P 2d at 86 The supreme court concluded that the principles underlying Pearce, Sorensen, 
Chess, and section 76-3-405 did not apply because a defendant is unlikely to appeal a sentence that is unlawfully 
lenient, so there is a "minimal chilling effect on the right to appeal" Id at 88 Unlike Babbel, Defendant's 
resentencing did not result from an original sentence contrary to statutory minimum mandatory requirements 
Rather, Defendant's original sentence was vacated because he was sentenced in absentia The sentence itself 
was not illegal, but the manner in which it was imposed was contrary to law Furthermore, allowing a harsher 
sentence when the original sentence was imposed in an illegal manner would have a "chilling effect on the right to 
appeal," id_, and impair the Utah Constitution's guaranty of the right to appeal See Sorenson, 639 P 2d at 181 
Therefore, because Babbel is not applicable, we conclude that the due process discussion in Pearce, Sorensen, 
and Chess require us to apply a presumption of vindictiveness Accordingly, we next consider whether the 
presumption is successfully rebutted ^ 
fl17 During resentencing the following colloquy took place 
DEFENSE COUNSEL [Mr Samora] would like the Court to be aware of some of the things that he's 
been doing while he's been incarcerated He served two months in jail before he was sentenced 
originally on this case and then he served an additional approximately four months, I think, since-
MR SAMORA Six Six months 
DEFENSE COUNSEL Six months And it would be~ 
THE COURT While you were pursuing the appeal? 
DEFENSE COUNSEL Yes, your Honor 
THE COURT Yeah Well, I mean, the point is, I guess, made 
DEFENSE COUNSEL [l]t would be my request on behalf of Mr Samora that the Court do a couple 
of things One, that the Court would waive the fine There is some restitution owing that was part of 
the negotiation in this case to the victim Mr Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly long-
term relationship before this all happened and there was, as part of the negotiation, he's to pay 
some restitution with respect to that 
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the 
Court give him credit for time served on this case 
THE COURT All right Thank you 
1118 After receiving the victim's testimony regarding the amount of restitution owed, the trial judge imposed the 
maximum one-year sentence, $2500 fine, a surcharge, and attorney fees The court also ordered Defendant to 
pay $744 80 in restitution, without any reduction in the fine, as Defendant had requested The trial judge initially 
denied Defendant's request for credit for the six months he had already served on his one-year sentence, but 
relented after Defendant filed his Motion to Reconsider Sentence 
1{19 The State argues that although Defendant "may have hoped for a reduction in his fine," the record does not 
indicate that his agreement to pay restitution was conditioned on such a reduction However, after reading the 
sentencing proceeding transcript in context, it is apparent that Defendant was asking the trial court to waive or 
substantially reduce his fine so that Defendant could instead pay restitution It is unreasonable to believe that 
Defendant volunteered to assume responsibility for restitution, which if imposed would substantially increase the 
monetary amount of Defendant's sentence, on the mere hope that his fine would be waived or reduced 
Furthermore, given extant case law and section 76-3-405, Defendant was not required to submit to a restitution 
order as part of resentencing, nor was the trial court empowered to order the same Given the record we have 
before us, we cannot conclude that the presumption of vindictiveness has been rebutted Therefore, error 
occurred because Defendant received a harsher sentence after exercising his constitutional right to appeal his 
original sentence,, 
1120 The State, howevei , also ai gues that Defendai it's harsher sentet ice vi as appi opriate ui idei Utal i Code Ai 11 i. § 
76-3-405(2)(a), which allows for an increased sentence when it is "based 01 i facts which were not known to the 
court at the time of the original sentence." The State argues that because the trial judge did not review the record, 
which included Defendant's obligation to pay restitution, before originally sentencing Defendant, the prohibition 
against a harsher sentence does not apply. We disagree 
1J21 I he record discloses that restitution was discussed at Defendants plea hearing. In addition, the record 
includes the "Statement of Defendant, Certificate of Counsel and Order," signed by Defendant, in which he 
agrees to pay restitution. The State cannot claim that the facts regarding restitution were unknown at the time of 
the original sentencing because the trial judge did not review the record before sentencing Defendant. A trial 
judge, like every other party to a proceeding, is charged with knowledge of what is in the record. Therefore, the 
trial judge's failure to familiarize himself with the record in this case does not satisfy the lack of knowledge 
requirement found in section 76-3-405. Furthermore, as noted in the per curiam opinion vacating Defendant's 
original sentence, the trial court at the original sentencing did not provide an opportunity for Defendant's counsel 
or the State to provide any information relevant to sentencing. See State v. Samora, 2001 I IT App 266 (per 
curiam). 
1J22 Having concluded that error occurred, we now turn to whether "the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208. Section 76-3-405, federal case law, Bakalov, and Sorenson clearly prohibit a 
harsher sentence on resentencing absent specific circumstances. The trial court did not address nor specify any 
basis for deviating from that mandate. Therefore, the error should have been recognized by the trial court, 
CONCLUSION 
1J23 We conclude that we have jurisdiction in this case despite Defendant's failure to preserve the issues before 
the trial court because the trial court illegally imposed sentence in the first sentencing. Alternatively, there was 
plain error in imposing sentence. Given the record before us, we conclude that the presumption of vindictiveness 
or retaliation has not been rebutted and Defendant received a harsher sentence on resentencing in derogation of 
section 76-3-405 and principles of due process. Therefore, we reverse and remand for sentencing in accordance 
with this opinion. At resentencing, the restitution order must be eliminated, or at Defendant's option and with the 
trial court's agreement, the fine may be reduced by the amount of restitution. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, ludge 
1124 I CONCUR: 
Norman H Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
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1f26 Judge Robin W. Reese took Defendants piea 
victim, his former girlfriend. Sentencing was th • 
failed to appear for sentencing, Judge Freder.^,, _ 
at proceeding, Defendant agreed to pay restitution to the 
ed before Judge J. Dennis Frederick. When Defendant 
™d him in absentia. No sentencing information was 
presented at that proceeding, and Judge Frederick imposed the maximum jail time and fine On the first appeal, 
this court reversed Defendant's sentence in accordance with State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 31 P 3d 615, 
cert granted, 42 P 3d 951 (Utah 2002) We then remanded the case for resentencing 
H27 At the resentencing hearing, Defendant appeared and affirmatively asserted that, under his plea agreement, 
he owed restitution He said he owed about $900, maybe "a little higher," although the victim testified that $744 80 
would cover her losses Judge Frederick ordered Defendant to pay the lesser sum in restitution, plus the 
maximum jail time and fine Apparently, Defendant had hoped that he would be ordered to pay just the restitution 
and no fine Defendant's attorney made the following statement to the court 
It would be my request on behalf of Mr Samora that the Court do a couple of things One, that 
the Court would waive the fine There is some restitution owing that was part of the negotiation in 
this case to the victim They've-Mr Samora and the victim in the case had a fairly long-term 
relationship before this all happened and there was, as a part of the negotiation, [an agreement] to 
pay some restitution with respect to that 
We'd ask the Court to-to waive or at least to reduce the fine substantially and-and ask that the 
Court give him credit for time served on this case 
1J28 Defendant never claimed below that the imposition of restitution, in addition to the fine, would violate due 
process or Utah Code Ann § 76-3-405 (1999) Because Defendant did not raise this issue below, we are 
precluded from addressing it unless Defendant can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or plain 
error occurred See State v Holgate, 2000 UT 741J11, 10 P 3d 346 On appeal, Defendant mentions plain error in 
reciting what he believes to be the applicable standard of review, but does not even purport to demonstrate how 
the trial court plainly erred We, therefore are precluded from addressing the issue 
1129 We would be precluded from addressing the issue even if Defendant had articulated a plain error argument 
on appeal "To establish plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that '(i) an error exists, (n) the error should 
have been obvious to the trial court, and (m) the error is harmful"' State v Pecht 2002 UT 41.H18, 48 P 3d 931 
(quoting State v Dunn, 850 P 2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)) Plain error, however, can never be urged when the 
appellant affirmatively invites the court's ruling See State v Perdue, 813 P 2d 1201, 1206 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
(stating that "where invited error butts up against manifest injustice [or plain error], the invited error rule prevails") 
"The doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on 
appeal'" ld_ at 1205 (citation omitted) Otherwise, a criminal defendant could invite prejudicial error and "implant it 
in the record as a form of appellate insurance " State v Parsons, 781 P 2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) In this 
case, Defendant affirmatively raised the issue of restitution and agreed that restitution was owing He did not 
claim that, if restitution were ordered, he had a due process or statutory entitlement to a reduction in the fine 
Given how he invited the court to impose restitution, Defendant is now in no position to challenge it on appeal 
See Perdue, 813 P 2d at 1205 
1J30 Even if we could properly reach the merits of Defendant's contention on appeal, the argument fails because 
the first sentence had no legal effect At resentencing, the trial court was therefore not limited by the terms of the 
first sentence See State v Babbel, 813 P 2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991) (stating that '"[t]he rule followed by most 
jurisdictions is that an unlawful sentence is of no legal effect, allowing the court to correct the sentence by 
imposing lawful terms at any time the illegality is discovered, regardless of whether the correction involves an 
increase'") (quoting Annotation, Power of Court to Increase Severity of Unlawful Sentence-Modern Status, 28 
A L R 4th 147, 152(1984)) 
H31 The mam opinion is wrong in trying to distinguish this case from Babbel In Babbel, the Utah Supreme Court 
cited the statute that preceded rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for the proposition that the trial 
court can '"correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time '" Babbel, 813 
P 2d at 87 (citation omitted) The supreme court stated that "[t]he correction of an illegal sentence stands on a 
different footing from the correction of an error in a conviction " Id at 88 Therefore, the court held that "the 
principles underlying" the cases holding that federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from being 
imposed in a second trial for the same offense after a reversal of the first conviction, "have no application [to t]he 
correction of an illegal sentence " Id 
1J32 The initial sentence ii i the present case was illegal because it was improperly imposed in Defendant's 
absence. That was precisely how the first appeal was argued. When we remanded the case, we expressly noted 
that the court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. See SMe y,__SamoxaJ 2001 UT App 266 at n.1 (per 
curiam) (unpublished mem. decision) (referring to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)). My colleagues cannot now change 
course and hold that a sentence imposed contrary to law is not an illegal sentence. Rule 22(e) itself treats equally 
"an illegal sentence" and "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Because this case 
involves an illegal sentence, there can be no presumption of vindictiveness as described in NgrtJi Carolina v, 
Pearce. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See Babbel, 813 P.2d at 87-88. When it resentenced Defendant, the trial court was 
therefore not limited by the terms of the prior sentence. SeejdL; see_aJso Iexas_y. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 
(1986) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 374 (1982), for the proposition that "[n]othing in the 
Constitution requires a judge to ignore 'objective inforrnatioi i ji istifying the increased sentence'"). 
1133 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. Wanosik held that due process and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(a) require a trial court to conduct 
adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Defendant's absence before proceeding to sentence in absentia. 
2001 UT App 241,1137-38, 31 P.3d 615. 
2. Hie burden is on the State to establish that Defendant's harsher sentence did not violate the requirements of 
due process and section 76-V405 SeeNorth Carolina_v._Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726, 89 S. Ct 2072, 2081 (1969). 
3. We discuss the colloqi ly i* :~ '^e n^\^\ i.res -r THIS Linon. 
4. I he State's brief does not address the Pearce presumption of vii u, . >a .^ . .ab-
original sentencing court did not know about restitution agreed to in i:.w , ^ , „._ .mposmor. :: 
restitution at resentencing was necessarily nonretaliatory. 
ADDENDUM B 
'Jin I illlii. Limitation on sentence 
prior sentence set aside. 
(1) W here a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on 
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new" sentence for the same 
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more 
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously 
satisfied. 
(2) This section does not apply when: 
(a) the increased sentence is based on facts which were not known to 
the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively 
places on the record the facts which provide the basis for the increased 
sentence; or 
(b) a defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution and 
later successfully moves to invalidate his conviction, in which case the 
defendant and the prosecution stand in the same position as though the 
plea bargain, conviction, and sentence had never occurred. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment. 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall bp not less than two 
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of 
punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. 
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds tha t a defendant may be tried in defendant's 
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a 
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be 
issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make the officer's re turn on the commitment and file it with 
the c-'iirt. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, a t any time. 
ff) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose 
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter J6a. Utah ('ode If the court 
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department 
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202< 1Kb), the court 
shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
(Amended effective January 1, 191)5, January 1, 1996.) 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
ADDENDUM C 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001906887 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: September 22, 2000 
e < r U 103075 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Prosecutor: MURPHY, J KEVIN 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OFJUDGMENTS 
DATE Q-cte-an 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 21, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:25-9:27 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/2000 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ 
INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
Case No: 001906887 
Date: Sep 22, 2000 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $2119 . 05 
Due: $4619.05 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$2500.00 
$0 
$2119.05 
$4619.05 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Pay fine to The Court. 
The Court finds defendant voluntarily absented himself from 
sentencing proceedings and the Court sentences the defendant in 
absentia. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings and order. 
Defendant to be committed forthwith upon his arrest on this 
Court's bench warrant 
Dated this 
REDERIC 
urt Jud< 
Page 2 ( last] 00043 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Manuel Ernesto Samora, 
Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No 20000884-CA 
F I L E D 
September 7, 2001 
|l 2001 UTApp266 [| 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable J Dennis Frederick 
Attorneys 
Joan C Watt and John K West, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff, Jeanne B Inouye, and Kevin Murphy, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme 
PER CURIAM 
Appellant Manuel Ernesto Samora appeals the sentence on his conviction of Attempted Joyriding, a class A 
misdemeanor 
The issues raised in Samora's appeal are the same issues determined in State v Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, 
428 Utah Adv Rep 10, regarding sentencing in absentia and a criminal defendant's Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 22(a) and Due Process rights Accordingly, Samora is entitled to be resentenced under Wanosik 
because the district court did not (1) make an adequate inquiry into the actual voluntariness of Samora's absence 
before proceeding to sentence him in absentia, (2) provide Samora the opportunity to present information through 
counsel in mitigation of punishment and also provide the prosecutor an opportunity to present information relevant 
to sentencing, and (3) base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information regarding the crime, 
defendant's background, and the interests of society See id at ffl]36-38 
The State seeks dismissal of this appeal, relying upon cases concluding that an appeal taken by a criminal 
defendant who is a fugitive may be dismissed, subject to reinstatement if the defendant returns to the jurisdiction 
and if the State cannot demonstrate that it will be prejudiced by reinstatement See, e g , State v Tuttle, 713 P 2d 
703, 705 (Utah 1985) Because Wanosik is dispositive of Samora's appeal and requires a remand for 
resentencing, we decline to dismiss this appeal(11 However, if Samora appeals the sentence imposed after 
remand, the State may raise the dismissal argument in the subsequent appeal 
We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with Wanosik 
Pamela T Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Judith M Billings, Judge 
Gregory K Orme, Judge 
1 Even if we were to dismiss this appeal, Samora could challenge the sentence in the trial court under Rule 22(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure See Utah R Crim P 22(e) ("The court may correct a sentence 
imposed in an illegal manner, at any time "), see also Wanosik, 241 UT App 241 at n 11 (stating issues regarding 
illegality of the sentence under Rule 22(a) can be considered for the first time on appeal under Rule 22(e)) 
Judicial economy suggests that we resolve the appeal from the sentence and preserve the State's ability to seek 
dismissal in any appeal taken after resentencing 
ADDENDUM E 
1* ft A O ^  H 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail 
MINUTES 
AMENDED SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, 
COMMITMENT 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001906887 FS 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Date: November 16, 2 001 
jfc* lo^lS 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Prosecutor: ESQUEDA, CARLOS A 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): WEST, JOHN K 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: August 21, 1958 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:54-10:02 
DATE 
ENTERED IN PIC! "TRY 
OFJUpQr./.^N/TS 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR (amended) 
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/08/2000 {Guilty Plea} 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED JOYRIDING W/ 
INTENT TO TEMP DEPRIVE OWNR a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Page 1 
001906887SAMORXMANUEL J D 
Case No: 001906887 
Date: Nov 16, 2001 
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE 
Credit for time served is granted originally awaiting disposition 
in this case. No credit will be given after warrant was issued and 
defendant arrested. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$2500.00 
$0.00 
$2119.05 
$4619.05 
Total Fine: $2500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $2119.05 
Total Principal Due: $4619.05 
Plus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
Restitution: 
Dated this k 
Amount: $744.80 
day of 
Page 2 (last) 
ADDENDUM F 
Appellant's Opening Brief in Samora I. Pages 2-4 
Standard of Review. This issue involves a question of law which is reviewed for 
correctness. See State v. Anderson. 929 P.2d 1107. 1110 (Utah 1996) (issue of whether 
defendant was properly sentenced in absentia involves a question of law). In addition, the 
ultimate issue as to whether Appellant voluntarily absented himself from sentencing is 
reviewed for correctness. See generally State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App. 
1996) (reviewing ultimate issue of whether consent to search was voluntary for 
correctness). While a trial judge ordinarily has discretion in sentencing, such discretion is 
not unlimited. See State v. Johnson. 856 P.2d 1064, 1071 (Utah 1993) ( recognizing trial 
court exceeds its discretion when it fails to sentence based on reliable and relevant 
information, and reviewing question of whether trial judge sentenced defendant based on 
reliable and relevant information as a question of law). Any underlying factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error. See generally State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) 
(factual findings are reviewed for clear error). 
Preservation. Although defense counsel was not given an opportunity to speak, the 
trial court nevertheless considered the issue of whether it was appropriate to proceed, and 
concluded that Appellant had voluntarily absented himself (R. 64:2). A copy of the 
sentencing transcript is in Addendum B. The trial court also entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, a copy of which is in Addendum C (R. 44-45). In fact, although the 
parties were never given the opportunity to address the issue of whether proceeding in 
absentia was appropriate under the circumstances of the case, the prosecutor was able to 
2 
prepare findings and conclusions on that issue (R. 64:2). Because the trial court 
considered this issue below, it is properly preserved for appellate review. .See State v. 
Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah 1989) (purpose of requiring that an issue be raised in the 
trial court is to allow the trial judge to review the issue and correct an error).1 
Alternatively, the trial judge committed plain error in proceeding in absentia and in 
failing to base the sentencing decision on relevant and reliable information without 
affording defense counsel the opportunity to speak. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071; Utah 
R. Crim. P. 22; State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993) (plain error occurs 
when an error is obvious and prejudices the defendant). Under Johnson and Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(a), the error in failing to conduct a full sentencing hearing was obvious as 
was the denial of Samora's right to presence at sentencing pursuant to Article I, 
section 12, Utah Constitution. The obvious error prejudiced Samora since he received the 
maximum sentence when he otherwise was a candidate for probation; see discussion infra 
at 11. 
1
 The purposes of the preservation rules are to: (1) allow trial counsel the 
opportunity to review and correct any errors, and (2) preclude defense counsel from 
foregoing objections as a matter of strategy and when the strategy does not work and 
defendant is convicted, claiming error. Eldredge. 773 P.2d at 36; State v. Labrum. 925 
P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 
497 U.S. 1024 (1990). In this case where the trial judge reviewed the issue of whether to 
proceed in absentia at sentencing and entered findings and conclusions on that issue, both 
of those purposes were met. The trial court had the opportunity to review the issue and 
correct the error, and no possible trial strategy existed for foregoing the objection. 
Accordingly, the issue was properly preserved for appeal. 
3 
Finally, the issue should also be reviewed because exceptional circumstances 
justifying review exist in this case. See State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 11 (Utah App. 1996). 
Utah R. Evid. 22(a) requires a trial judge to afford defendant the opportunity to provide 
relevant information at sentencing; due process requires the judge to conduct a full and 
fair sentencing hearing. Where the judge does not afford counsel the opportunity to speak 
and does not conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing, a procedural anomaly requiring 
review exists. See id. (exceptional circumstances doctrine generally applies to rare 
procedural anomalies). In addition, the question of whether the trial judge imposed legal 
sentence is of widespread interest as evidenced by the number of cases before this Court 
raising a similar issue. Id. (doctrine of exceptional circumstances may be applied where 
"matters of extraordinary importance or widespread interest" exist). Without appellate 
review, the egregious violation of due process, Utah R. Crim. P. 22 and the right to 
presence which occurred in this case would go unchecked. In this case where the trial 
judge had the obligation to conduct a full and fair sentencing hearing and failed to do so, 
exceptional circumstances require that this Court review the issue on appeal. 
Issue 2. Whether Appellant waived his right to appeal by failing to appear at 
sentencing. 
Preservation. The state raised this issue in its response to this Court's sua sponte 
motion for summary disposition. This Court ordered that this issue be considered as part 
of the plenary review of this case. See Addendum D. 
4 
ADDENDUM G 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— 0 0 O 0 0 — 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v 
Thomas C Headley, 
Defendant and Appellant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No 990462-CA 
F I L E D 
February 28, 2002 
ll 2002 UT App 58 |[ 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Tyrone Medley 
Attorneys 
Edward R Montgomery, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff and Thomas Brunker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thome 
JACKSON, Presiding Judge 
Thomas Headley appeals the district court's denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence submitted under Rule 
22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure He contends the district court erred in ruling that his motion did 
"not attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed " Headley's 
contention is two-fold (1) his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, and (2) the sentencing court 
relied on information in the presentence report that the court knew was false We affirm 
A district court's Rule 22(e) decision is a legal question that we review for correctness, see State v Brooks, 908 
P 2d 856, 858-59 (Utah 1995), State v Patience, 944 P 2d 381, 384-85 (Utah Ct App 1997), and we can affirm 
the decision "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record " State v Fmlayson, 2000 
UT 10,H31, 994 P 2d 1243 Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for resentencing when a 
sentence is illegal or "imposed in an illegal manner" Utah R Cnm P 22(e) The definition of an "illegal sentence" 
has been construed narrowly to include only sentences "where the sentence does not conform to the crime of 
which the defendant has been convicted " ^ State v Parker, 872 P 2d 1041, 1043 n 2 (Utah Ct App 1994) Utah 
law has no comprehensive definition of sentences "imposed in an illegal manner", however, the Utah Supreme 
Court has ruled that a sentence is imposed in an illegal manner when a defendant is deprived of his or her Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during sentencing (2) See Kuehnertv Turner, 28 Utah 2d 150, 499 P 2d 839, 841 
(1975) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because the defendant did not have counsel at sentencing, was 
not informed of his Sixth Amendment rights during sentencing, and had not knowingly and intelligently waived his 
Sixth Amendment rights) £) In Kuehnert, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the presence of counsel at 
sentencing is necessary 
so that there is a real opportunity to present to the court facts in extenuation of the offense or in 
explanation of the defendant's conduct, as well as to correct any errors or mistakes in reports of the 
defendant's past record and to appeal to the equity of the court in its administration and enforcement 
of penal laws 
l i at 840-41 Ml 
Headley first claims his counsel at sentencing provided ineffective assistance, thus depriving him of his Sixth 
Amendment right To support his claim, Headley makes six assertions, four are as follows (1) he asserts that his 
challenge to misinformation in the presentence investigation report was rejected by the sentencing court because 
it was poorly handled by sentencing counsel, (2) he challenges several factual statements contained in the 
presentence investigation report, (3) he asserts that "his own counsel accused him of being involved in incest 
when that information was not otherwise before the court", and (4) he asserts that "his [sentencing] counsel 
convinced a witness with potentially exculpatory evidence not to cooperate with [Headley]" Each of these four 
assertions has some connection with the presentence investigation report, which is not in the record on appeal 
Further, no other information in the record supports these assertions Accordingly, as discussed below, we are 
unable to address them 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court imposed a $10,000 fine without reason and without objection by his 
counsel We find no mention of a $10,000 fine in the record The only fines mentioned in the sentencing context, a 
$1,000 recoupment fee and an unspecified amount to "pay for costs of extradition and for therapy of victim," are 
found in the sentencing transcript and the Judgment filed three days later Finally, Headley alleges that "his 
counsel intentionally tried to prevent him from pursuing an appeal" However, the record reflects that Headley filed 
a notice of appeal on September 24,1992, but voluntarily moved to dismiss his appeal to "file a motion to 
withdraw his plea of guilty " Headley's motion was granted on October 8, 1992, and the record contains no 
indication of subsequent attempts to appeal the case 
Without the presentence report or other information which may or may not be in the sentencing court record, the 
record submitted to us is inadequate for our review of Headley's ineffective assistance claim All we have are 
Headley's unilateral, bald assertions of misconduct As we have stated, 
When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and responsibility of 
supporting such allegation by an adequate record Absent that record, a defendant's assignment of 
error stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing court has no power to determine [An 
appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record Consequently, in the face of an [inadequate record on appeal, [we] 
must assume the regularity of the proceedings below 
State v Penman, 964 P 2d 1157, 1162 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (alterations in original), 
see also State v Litherland, 2000 UT 76,1117, 12 P 3d 92 ("Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, 
ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel 
performed effectively ") Accordingly, we reject Headley's Sixth Amendment claim 
Next, Headley claims the sentencing court was biased because it relied on information in the presentence report 
that the court knew was false Utah Code Ann § 77-18-1(6) (Supp 2001) gives a sentencing judge discretion in 
evaluating information in a presentence report and requires the judge to "make a determination of relevance and 
accuracy on the record " Here, the sentencing judge made a determination of the relevance and accuracy of the 
presentence report, deciding the presentence report was "comprehensive in all the details," and stating that those 
working on elements of the presentence report "do a pretty good job " The sentencing court has broad discretion 
to resolve factual disputes for or against a defendant, see id , and we cannot say the court exceeded its discretion 
in making this determination Further, without the presentence report, the record is inadequate and M,[we] must 
assume the regularity of the proceedings below '" Penman, 964 P 2d at 1162 (citation omitted) (alteration in 
original) 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Headley's Rule 22(e) motion for resentencing 
Norman H Jackson, 
Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR 
William A Thome Jr, Judge 
GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in the result) 
I concur in the result reached by my colleagues, but would affirm on what I perceive to be a more straightforward 
basis As stated by the majority, the trial court denied defendant's Rule 22(e) motion because the motion did "not 
attack the legality of the sentence imposed nor the manner in which the sentence was imposed " The trial court 
was correct 
Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous fact findings by the sentencing judge are 
simply not cognizable under Rule 22(e) Defendant has not cited any caselaw holding otherwise and has also not 
offered any reasoned analysis for why Rule 22(e) should apply to his case See State v Thomas, 961 P 2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998) (briefs must include "reasoned analysis based on [cited] authority") The sentence imposed was 
permissible under applicable statutes, and the trial court properly resolved factual disputes presented to it 
Defendant raises no claims legitimately related to whether the sentence was illegal or "imposed in an illegal 
manner" Utah R Cnm P 22(e) On that basis, I would affirm 
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge 
1 Nonconforming sentences include those where the sentence exceeds the statutory limits See, e g , State v 
Higginbotham, 917 P 2d 545, 551 (Utah 1996) (concluding that the sentence was illegal because statute only 
authorized one year enhancement and the court enhanced sentence by two years), State v Patience, 944 P 2d 
381, 388 (Utah Ct App 1997) (noting that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded statutory term) 
Nonconforming sentences also occur when the court is without jurisdiction to impose a sentence See, e g , State 
v Hurst, 777 P 2d 1029, 1036 n 6 (Utah 1989) (stating that sentences can be attacked when beyond the 
jurisdiction of the sentencing court), State v Arviso, 1999 UT App 381,1ffi5-8, 993 P 2d 894 (stating that the 
sentence was illegal because Supremacy Clause deprived sentencing court of jurisdiction), State v Grate, 947 
P 2d 1161, 1168 (Utah Ct App 1997) (stating that the sentence was illegal because court did not have 
jurisdiction to revoke probation) 
2 Other jurisdictions have defined sentences imposed in an illegal manner as those that are within statutory and 
jurisdictional limits, but violate a defendant's rights, see, e g , Government of the V I v Martinez, 239 F 3d 293, 
299 n 3 (3rd Cir 2001), State v McNeills, 546 A 2d 292, 305-06 (Conn Ct App 1988), State v Sieler, 554 
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